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Theories Of Employment Discrimination In The 
United Kingdom And The United States* 
by Steven L. Willborn** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have accepted the law as an 
appropriate instrument for dealing with the problem of employment discrimi-
nation. 1 In the United States, there are several federal statutes2 and literally 
hundreds of state and local laws3 that prohibit employment discrimination. In 
the United Kingdom, three statutes constitute the principal governmental re-
sponse to the issue.4 The general approach to antidiscrimination legislation in 
the United States and the United Kingdom is quite similar. Both countries 
prohibit employment discrimination with broad statutory language, both estab-
lish agencies to administer the laws, both emphasize mediation and conciliation 
as a means of settling disputes, and both repose ultimate enforcement authority 
in the courts. These similarities are largely the product of an historical cross-
* Copyright © 1986 Steven L. Willborn. 
** Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. 
1 Although proponents of the law and economics movement in the United States have questioned 
this acceptance, R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 351-407 (1981); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW 533-38 (2d ed. 1977); cf also Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988 
(1984); Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE 
L. REV. 1357 (1983), they are clearly not in the mainstream on this issue as evidenced by the sheer 
volume of antidiscrimination laws in the United States. See infra notes 2 & 3. 
2 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982); Equal Pay Act 
of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982). 
3 Of the states, only Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi do not have laws prohibiting employment 
discrimination. The vast majority of the states have at least two laws, one modeled after the federal 
Equal Pay Act of 1963, supra note 2, and one modeled after the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra 
note 2. See S. WILLBORN, A COMPARABLE WORTH PRIMER 70 (1986); Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable 
Worth Under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 238-
66 (1984). Although I know of no comprehensive survey, there are also a great number of local laws 
prohibiting employment discrimination. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) (fifty-two county and municipal 
antidiscrimination agencies are recognized by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
as "designated agencies" for procedural purposes). 
4 Race Relations Act, 1976 [hereinafter cited as R.R.A.]; Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 [hereinafter 
cited as S.D.A.]; Equal Pay Act, 1970 [hereinafter cited as E.P.A.]. 
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fertilization. While the roots of U.S. law are found in English legal history,5 the 
roots of British discrimination law are found in recent U.S. legal history.6 
These general similarities, however, are overshadowed by an important and 
dramatic difference between the two countries: the laws in the United States, 
but not in the United Kingdom, are supported by a refined and mature legal 
theory of discrimination. 7 In the United States, a jurisprudence has been and 
is being articulated which answers many of the difficult questions posed by 
antidiscrimination legislation and, more importantly, which provides a frame-
work for addressing the still unanswered questions. In the United Kingdom. 
an employment discrimination jurisprudence has been very slow in coming and 
is still in a very immature state. This lack of theoretical development has been 
a major contributing factor to the current malaise in British discrimination law.s 
This article discusses this difference between the United States and the United 
Kingdom by examining the two basic models of discrimination used in the two 
countries. The article concludes by speculating on the reasons for the difference 
in theoretical development and by commenting on the message of this analysis 
for the United Kingdom and the United States. 
II. MODELS OF DISCRIMINATION 
The United States and the United Kingdom share two basic models of dis-
crimination. The first model encompasses the common understanding of dis-
crimination. An employer discriminates by treating some people less favorably 
than others because of their race or sex. This type of discrimination is called 
direct discrimination in the United Kingdom and disparate treatment discrim-
ination in the United States. The second model of discrimination is less obvious. 
An employer discriminates under this model by using an employment require-
5 See gtmerally J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 25, 99 (1950); M. HOROWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-18604-9, 16-19 (1977); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 2-8,19-25 (1977); L. FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 15-25 (1973); Nolan, Sir William 
Blackstone and the Neu' American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 731 (1976). 
6 The Equal Pay Act, 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 bear a close resemblance to their 
U.S. predecessors, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the 
words of Lord Denning, "the English legislation is based a good deal upon the United States experi-
ence." Shields v. E. Coomes Ltd., [1978]I.C.R. 1159,1167-68 (C.A.). See also H. STREET, G. HOWE & 
G. BINDMAN, REPORT ON ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 7-54 (1967). It should be noted at the 
outset that in one major respect British discrimination law has broken entirely from its U.S. origins. 
On the issue of equal pay for women, the British and U.S. approaches are quite different substantively 
and procedurally. A discussion of the issue is outside the scope of this article, but it should be noted 
that, although the British are attacking the equal pay issue more aggressively, British advances on this 
front are also being hampered by shortcomings in discrimination theory. See Willborn, Equal Pay for 
Work of Equal Value: Comparable Worth in the United Kingdom, 34 AM. J. COMPo L. 415 (1986). 
7 The terms "theory" and 'jurisprudence" are used in this article to refer to the policy and conceptual 
bases of discrimination law. 
S See Lustgarten, Racial Inequality and the Limits of the Law, 49 MODERN L. REV. 68 (1986). 
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ment which falls more harshly on one racial or sexual group and which is not 
required by business considerations. This type of discrimination is called indirect 
discrimination in the United Kingdom and disparate impact discrimination in 
the United States. Although the two countries share these basic models, the 
development of the models has differed dramatically. In the United States, the 
models have been refined into very sophisticated tools for attacking discrimi-
nation; in the United Kingdom, they remain fairly blunt instruments. 
A. Direct Discrimination 
A case of direct discrimination is an inquiry into the motivation for an em-
ployment decision. If the employer makes an employment decision because of 
an employee'S race or sex, the decision is directly discriminatory. If the decision 
is made for any other reason, it is permissible. Persons claiming discrimination 
under this model face two imposing obstacles. First, proving motivation is an 
extremely difficult and subtle task. The "true" motivation for an employment 
decision is to be found only in the mind of the employer. But proving the state 
of the employer's mind at the time an employment decision is made is a delicate 
task. The employer wishes to avoid liability for employment discrimination, so 
his statements about his state of mind are less than reliable. Even if the employer 
is completely honest and forthcoming, social science research indicates that the 
employer may not be aware of subtle discriminatory influences affecting his 
decision.9 Second, persons claiming discrimination are handicapped in proving 
discriminatory motivation because virtually all of the relevant evidence is in the 
control of the employer. IO The task of the law, therefore, is to create an analytical 
structure which permits claimants to create an inference of direct discrimination 
in the face of these obstacles. 
An analytical structure for considering individual cases of discrimination has 
been formulated in both the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
structure formulated in the United Kingdom has been rejected in favor of a 
relatively formless, ad hoc mode of decision making, while the structure formu-
lated in the United States has become an integral part of the law. The approach 
in the United Kingdom is best exemplified by the Industrial Tribunal and 
Employment Appeal Tribunal decisions in Khanna v. Ministry of Defence. ll In 
9 See, e.g., Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination,Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979); Rosen & Jerdee, Effects of Applicant'S Sex and Difficulty of Job on 
Evaluations of Candidates for Managerial Positions, 59 JOURNAL OF ApPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 511 (1974); 
Rosen & Jerdee, Sex Stereotyping in the Executive Suite, 52 HARV. Bus. REV. 45 (1974); Rosen & Jerdee, 
Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions, 59 JOURNAL OF ApPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 9 (1974); 
Fidell, Empirical Verification of Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices, 25 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1094 
(1970). 
!O See The British Library v. Palyza, [1984]I.C.R. 504, 505-06. 
II [1981]I.C.R. 653. 
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Khanna, Mr. Khanna was an Indian who had been employed as a photographer 
by the Ministry of Defence for 15 years. In 1979, the post of principal photog-
rapher in his unit became vacant. Mr. Khanna was temporarily "ppointed to 
the position while a job search was conducted. Although Mr. Khanna applied 
for the position, it was given to a Mr. Spooner, a white man. Mr. Khanna 
commenced a discrimination proceeding. The Industrial Tribunal found that 
Mr. Khanna was more qualified than Mr. Spooner and hence, held that he had 
created an inference of discrimination which shifted the evidential burden to 
the Ministry of Defence to give some explanation for its decision. To meet its 
burden, the Ministry of Defence relied on the testimony of members of the 
hiring board that they had not acted with any racial motivation. The Industrial 
Tribunal concluded that although the considerations in the case were finely 
balanced, the ultimate burden of proof was on Mr. Khanna and hence, it held 
that his discrimination claim had failed. In deciding the case, the Industrial 
Tribunal articulated a structure for considering individual claims of discrimi-
nation such as Mr. Khanna's. The structure initially requires the person claiming 
discrimination to create an inference of discrimination (most commonly through 
a comparison with a person of another race or of the opposite sex). Once this 
inference is created, the evidential burden is shifted to the employer to explain 
the nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse decision. The ultimate burden 
of proof, however, remains on the one claiming discrimination. This structure 
was short-lived; the Empioyment Appeal Tribunal rejected it in favor of a 
formless mode of analysis. The Employment Appeal Tribunal said that the 
burden-shifting structure was "more likely to obscure than to illuminate the 
right answer" and that it would be better for Industrial Tribunals to "forget 
about" and "avoid" such concepts. 12 Instead, Industrial Tribunals should "sim-
ply" decide whether discrimination has been proven after "looking at all the 
evidence as a whole."13 
The analytical structure in the United States for individual cases of direct 
discrimination resembles, but is in significant respects different from, the struc-
ture forwarded by the Industrial Tribunal in Khanna. In the United States, Mr. 
Khanna could have raised an inference of discrimination by proving that he 
belonged to a racial minority, that he applied and was minimally qualified for 
12 [d. at 658-59. 
IS [d. The Employment Appeal Tribunal did articulate a structure that would require employers to 
give a "clear and specific" explanation for an employment decision after the "primary facts" had 
created an inference of discrimination. [d. The structure, however, must be read in light of the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal's explicit rejection of the more formalized structure of the Industrial 
Tribunal and in light of the Employment Appeal Tribunal's call for decisions based on "all the facts 
of the case." [d. Moreover, the Tribunal made no attempt to define "primary facts" and, hence, gave 
no guidance on the nature of plaintiff's prima facie case. 
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ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants, and that he was rejected. I4 
This proof eliminates the two most common nondiscriminatory reasons for 
rejecting an applicant - no job opening and lack of qualifications - and hence, 
is sufficient to shift to the employer the burden of providing an explanation 
for the applicant's rejection. IS In the United States, then, the burden of 
proceedingI6 shifts to the employer even earlier than proposed by the Industrial 
Tribunal in Khanna. In the United States, in contrast to Khanna, the applicant 
need not present any evidence comparing his qualifications with those of the 
person selected for the job to shift the burden of proceeding. If the employer's 
decision was based on the comparative qualifications of the applicants, it is the 
employer's responsibility to raise the issue. After an inference of discrimination 
is created, the employer's burden is to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscri-
minatory reason for the employee's rejection."17 The employer does not have 
the burden of persuasion at this point - that burden remains on the applicant 
- but the employer does have the burden of forwarding a reason for the 
challenged decision. In Khanna, the employer would have articulated two re-
sponses to the applicant's prima facie case: 1) Mr. Spooner was more qualified 
than Mr. Khanna and 2) those making the decision testified that they did not 
discriminate. The burdens of persuasion and proceeding would then shift back 
to the applicant to prove that these reasons are "pretext," that they are not the 
true reasons for the decision. If the applicant satisfied the fact-finder that these 
were not the true reasons for the decision, as Mr. Khanna would be able to do 
in this case,IS he would prevail. 
The analytical structure in the United States is preferable to the formless 
approach of the United Kingdom. Although the initial applicant and employer 
burdens are quite easy to satisfy,I9 the first two stages of the U.S. structure serve 
to focus the issue in a manner that may not occur in the United Kingdom. In 
14 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 u.s. 792 (1973); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
15 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977); Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). 
16 U.S. employment discrimination law, and U.S. law in general, distinguishes between the burden 
of proceeding and the burden of persuasion. The burden of proceeding, which shifts to the employer 
after an applicant's prima facie case, is merely the burden of producing some evidence on a particular 
fact in issue. The burden of persuasion, which remains on the applicant throughout an individual 
direct discrimination case, is the heavier burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is 
true. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 946-56 (E. Cleary ed. 3d ed. 1984). 
I7 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. See also Board of Trustees of Keene State 
College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). 
18 Mr. Khanna would have been able to counter the employer's responses because I) the Tribunal 
found, contrary to the employer's assertion, that Mr. Khanna was more qualified than Mr. Spooner 
and 2) a bare denial of subjective intention to discriminate is unlikely to satisfy the employer's burden 
of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. 
19 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1155-56 (1976). 
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the United States, the ultimate issue in the Khanna case would have been quite 
narrow: was Mr. Khanna more qualified than Mr. Spooner? In the United 
Kingdom, the ultimate issue proposed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
was very broad: viewing all the evidence as a whole, has discrimination been 
proven? The extent to which the U.S. structure focuses the issues is beneficial 
for three reasons. First, it leads to a more orderly and comprehensible pres-
entation of evidence. The applicant need not respond to every possible nondis-
criminatory explanation for an employment decision, but only to those expla-
nations articulated by the employer. The employer chooses his turf and can 
tailor his evidence to the relatively narrow issue(s) presented; he need not 
respond to the flurry of allegations that might otherwise result. Second, the 
U.S. structure responds to one of the major obstacles facing applicants in direct 
discrimination cases - that virtually all of the evidence is in the control of the 
employer. The employer is not permitted to fight a guerrilla war by attacking 
the applicant's claims from an undisclosed position. Instead, because of the easy 
initial burden on the applicant, the employer is forced to disclose the alleged 
reason for his decision and to defend it. Third, the U.S. structure tends to 
minimize the discretion of decision makers. Although any effort to objectify 
legal decision making is doomed,20 narrowly focused issues leave less room for 
the play of decisionmaker bias than do more broadly framed issues. The effort 
to minimize discretion is particularly important in the area of discrimination 
where prejudices, often unconscious,21 are the precise antithesis of the law's 
purpose. The explicit assumption of the British procedure - that the decision-
maker can "simply"22 decide whether discrimination has occurred - danger-
ously underestimates the subtlety of race and sex discrimination. 
Differences in the analytical structures for considering individual cases of 
direct discrimination, however, are minor compared to differences in another 
aspect of the direct discrimination model. In the United States, an applicant 
can also prove direct discrimination by presenting statistical evidence that an 
employer has systematically treated one race or sex less favorably. U.S. law 
assumes that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will result in a work force that 
20 Objective decision making was a principal target of the legal realists. See In Re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 
138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) (legal system reflects prejudices and preconceptions 
of judges and society); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xiii, 115 (6th ed. 1963) Uudges' decisions 
influenced by their temperament, training and biases); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING ApPEALS 3-4, 11-18, 393 (1963) Uudicial decisions influenced by human psychology and 
other factors). The attack has been picked up with a vengeance by the Critical Legal Studies movement. 
See Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From 
Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670-76 (1982). For a recent discussion 
of the issue in the area of employment discrimination, see Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEO. L.J. 1041 
(1985). 
21 See supra note 9. 
22 Khanna, [198IJI.C.R. at 658. 
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reflects the racial and sexual composition of the community from which em-
ployees are hired. 23 As a result, if an applicant can prove that an employer's 
work force has a significantly smaller proportion of blacks than the community 
from which the employer makes his hiring decisions,24 the inference is that the 
employer'S hiring decisions are tainted by race discrimination. In a leading case, 
for example, a national employer employed no black long distance truck drivers 
in Atlanta or Los Angeles. In Atlanta, 22 percent of the population of the 
metropolitan area from which the company made its hiring decisions25 was black 
and 51 percent of the population of the city proper was black. In Los Angeles, 
the correlative figures were 11 percent and 18 percent respectively.26 The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that these figures were sufficient to create an inference of 
systemic direct discrimination. Once such a case is established, an inference of 
discrimination attaches to every hiring decision made by the company during 
the relevant time period. If an applicant proves that he applied for a job with 
the company,27 a finding of discrimination is appropriate unless the company 
can prove that it did not discriminate in that instance. 28 
23 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977); Hazel-
wood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977). 
24 The comparison is between the racial composition of the employer's work force (or, more likely, 
a portion of the employer's work force) and the racial composition of the community from which the 
employer makes his hiring decisions. The community from which the employer makes his hiring 
decisions will vary depending on the type of job under consideration. For a job which does not require 
special qualifications, the community may include all those seeking employment within a reasonable 
commuting distance of the employer. For a job which requires special qualifications, however, the 
community would include only those who meet the qualifications and live within the recruiting area 
of the employer. Thus, for a company that hires both janitors and brain surgeons, there would be two 
relevant comparison communities. For janitors, the community might be all those seeking employment 
within a reasonable commuting area. For brain surgeons, however, the community would probably be 
those qualified to practice as brain surgeons in the relevant jurisdiction. It is likely that the racial 
compositions of the two comparison communities would differ dramatically. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 
at308n.13. 
25 Technically, most of the decisions in the case were transfer or promotion decisions, but that 
distinction makes no difference for the purposes of this illustration. 
26 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337 n.17. 
27 An applicant may also prevail by proving that, although he did not apply, he would have applied 
but for the employer's discriminatory practices. 
28 A successful systemic direct discrimination case, then, substantially alters the allocation of burdens. 
In an individual case, the applicant must prove that 1) he applied for 2) a job opening 3) for which 
he was qualified and 4) that he was rejected. Once the applicant proves these elements, only the 
burden of proceeding shifts to the employer to articulate the reason for the decision to reject. After 
the employer articulates a reason, the burden of proceeding shifts back to the applicant to prove that 
the reason articulated by the employer was not the true reason for the decision. The burden of 
persuasion always remains on the applicant. In contrast, once systemic direct discrimination is proven, 
an applicant need only prove that he applied for a job to shift both the burdens of proceeding and 
persuasion to the employer. The employer must prove that there was not a job opening when the 
applicant applied, that the applicant was not qualified, or whatever other reason might have existed 
for the applicant's rejection. The inference of discrimination that is created by the use of statistics 
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The theory of systemic direct discrimination is based on probability theory. 
The classic example is coin flipping to determine whether a coin is fair. Prob-
ability theory would begin with an assumption about reality: if the coin is fair, 
one would expect the number of heads and tails to be approximately equal over 
time. If after a number of flips the number of heads and tails is not equal, the 
inference is that the coin is not fair. The theory of systemic direct discrimination 
also makes an assumption about reality: if hiring procedures are fair, one would 
expect the proportion of blacks in an employer's work force and in the qualified 
labor force to be approximately equal. If that assumption is not met over time, 
the inference is that the hiring procedures are not fair. Indeed, in the United 
States, the inference of discrimination created by this type of evidence is 
stronger than the inference created by an applicant's prima facie case in an 
individual case of direct discrimination. 29 
The theory of systemic direct discrimination is not to be found in British 
employment discrimination cases. 30 No case finds an employer liable because of 
an inference of discrimination created by statistical evidence of a disparity 
between the racial composition of an employer's work force and that of the 
qualified labor force from which the employer hires. To the contrary, British 
courts have refused to allow discovery of this type of evidence because it is 
irrelevant3l and have stated that undue reliance on such evidence would be 
clearly erroneous.32 The absence of the theory of systemic direct discrimination 
in British law is not based on restrictive language in the statutes,33 or on legiti-
persists throughout the case and attaches to the claim of the individual applicant, thus easing his 
burdens and increasing those of the employer. 
29 In an individual direct discrimination case, an applicant'S prima facie case shifts only the burden 
of proceeding to the employer; in a systemic direct discrimination case, an applicant's prima facie case 
shifts both the burden of proceeding and the burden of persuasion to the employer. 
so Although the theory has not yet found its way into judicial decisions, the Commission for Racial 
Equality has evidenced awareness of it. The Commission has included a very crude form of this 
analysis in its Code of Practice, but appears to limit its use to identifying situations in which positive 
discrimination is appropriate. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, CODE OF PRACTICE 20 (1984). In 
addition, the Commission has used this type of analysis in its investigations. See, e.g., Beaumont 
Shopping Center, Report of a Formal Investigation (1985). 
31 Jalota v. Imperial Metal Industries (Kynoch) Limited, [1979]I.R.L.R. 313, 314-15. 
32 Owen & Briggs v. James, [1981]I.C.R. 377, 383. 
33 The basic language of the race and sex discrimination acts supports application of the theory of 
systemic direct discrimination. Both acts prohibit an employer from treating persons "less favourably" 
because of their race or sex, R.R.A., supra note 4, at § 1(I)(a); S.D.A., supra note 4, at § 1(I)(a), and 
the theory of systemic direct discrimination is merely one way of proving less favourable treatment. 
It is the U.S. law that contains language which seems to restrict application of the theory. Section 
703U) of Title VII, 42 U .S.c. § 2000eU) (1982), provides that no employer shall be required "to grant 
preferential treatment to any individual ... on account of an imbalance which may exist [between the] 
percentage of persons of any race ... employed by any employer [and the] percentage of persons of 
such race ... in the available work force." The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that this section 
does not limit application of the systemic direct discrimination model. International Brotherhood of 
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mate concerns about technicaP4 or remedial35 problems with the theory, or on 
any other articulated reason. The theory has simply not entered into the legal 
debate on antidiscrimination law. 36 As a result, with virtually no debate and for 
no articulated reason, British law is deprived of an important legal weapon 
against discrimination, a weapon that is well-recognized and often used in the 
United States. 
B. Indirect Discrimination 
A case of indirect discrimination is an inquiry into the effects and purposes 
of an employment rule or practice. In both the United Kingdom and the United 
States, a case of indirect discrimination has three stages. First, the applicant has 
the burden of proving that the proportion of women who can comply with a 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). British law contains no such restrictive 
language. 
34 The theory of systemic direct discrimination requires one to measure the racial or sexual com-
position of an employer's work force, to define and measure the racial or sexual composition of the 
relevant labor market, and to assess the significance of any disparity in the respective racial or sexual 
compositions. Each step raises difficult technical questions, often relating to statistics. See Hazelwood 
School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL 
STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 16-33 (1980); Follett & Welch, Testing for Discrimi-
nation in Employment Practices, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (1983); Boardman & Vining, The Role 
of Probative Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (1983); Shoben, 
The Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1983). 
These technical problems have not been cited by the courts or commentators in the United Kingdom 
as reasons for rejecting or limiting the theory. 
35 Remedial problems arise because the theory creates an inference of discrimination that applies to 
a large number of potential discriminatees over a long period of time. At the time the finding of 
discrimination is made, it may not be possible to locate many of the discriminatees and any remedy 
to compensate them fully would have adverse effects on those who, although not actual discriminators, 
have benefitted from the company's past discrimination. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. I, 36-43 (1976). The unavailability of class actions in the United Kingdom may ease these 
problems, but in any event they have not been cited as a reason for rejecting or limiting the systemic 
direct discrimination theory. 
36 The theory of systemic direct discrimination has been mentioned in the literature. In a 1980 
casenote, an author remarked on the absence of the theory in the United Kingdom and on the failure 
of the courts to address the questions that might be raised by the theory. Note, falota v. Imperial Metal 
Industries: More Bonds for the Fettered Runner? 43 MODERN L. REV. 215 (1980). A more detailed analysis 
was made in L. LUSTGARTEN, LEGAL CONTROL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1980), but, although I want 
to commend the author on his attempt to raise the issue, his understanding of U.S. law was quite 
shallow. To raise only one of many examples, the author stated that one can normally assume that 
since 50 percent of the population is female, that is the proper figure against which to compare an 
employer's record. Id. at 50. But, of course, the proportion of the labor force which is female may be, 
and usually is, considerably less than 50 percent, and the proportion of the qualified labor force for 
a particular job may be considerably smaller (e.g., barrister) or greater (e.g., nurses) than 50 percent. 
Most commentators, however, do far worse than Mr. Lustgarten by failing to even broach the topic. 
See, e.g., A LESTER & G. BINDMAN, RACE AND LAW (1972); B. HEPPLE, RACE, JOBS AND THE LAW IN 
BRITAIN (2d ed. 1970). I think it is fair to say that the legal debate in the literature has largely ignored, 
or been oblivious to, the theory of systemic direct discrimination. 
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job requirement is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can 
comply with it. 37 For example, if an employer requires employees to be at least 
six feet in height, an applicant might prove disproportionate impact by pres-
enting evidence that the requirement would eliminate 50 percent of all men 
and 95 percent of all women.38 The employer then has the burden of proving 
a business justification for the rule. In the example, the employer might prove 
that the employee must be at least six feet tall because the job requires him to 
reach objects on high shelves. If the employer proves a business justification for 
the rule, the burden shifts to the applicant to show a less discriminatory alter-
native. The applicant in our example might prove that stepladders could be 
used to reach the objects on high shelves with minimal cost and no loss in 
efficiency. 
The British model of indirect discrimination, like the direct discrimination 
model, is unsophisticated and immature in comparison with the model in the 
United States. The problem is not that the British courts and commentators 
have given different answers than their U.S. counterparts to the questions posed 
by the model, but rather that the questions have remained largely unanswered, 
indeed unaddressed, in the United Kingdom. 
A sophisticated and mature model of discrimination must begin with an 
acceptable theory. The theoretical basis of the indirect discrimination model is 
not intuitively obvious.39 Why should an employment criterion be illegal when 
it does not discriminate on its face and when it is not used with a discriminatory 
purpose? This issue has sparked a voluminous and heated debate in the United 
States. At least four distinct theoretical bases have been proposed.40 Under the 
intent theory, indirect discrimination is a branch of the direct discrimination 
tree; indirect discrimination is illegal because proof of it is sufficient proof of 
illegal motivation to create liability. Another theory, the past discrimination 
theory, contends that indirect discrimination is a mechanism for isolating and 
rectifying the continuing effects of past discrimination. 41 The functional equiv-
37 S.D.A., supra note 4, at § 1(1)(b)(i); R.R.A., supra note 4, at § 1(1)(b)(i). 
38 This is a hypothetical example. I have no idea of the actual percentages of men and women over 
six feet in height. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
39 In contrast, the theoretical basis of the direct discrimination model is intuitively obvious. As 
President Kennedy stated to the United States Congress in 1963: 
Race discrimination hampers our economic growth by preventing the maximum development 
and utilization of our manpower. It hampers our world leadership by contradicting at home 
the message we preach abroad ... above all, it is wrong. 
President's Message to Congress on Civil Rights, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 221, 222 (Feb. 28, 1963). 
40 For a more thorough discussion of these theories, see Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model: Theory 
and Limits, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 799 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Willborn]. 
41 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 
F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1984); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC 
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alence theory is the third and most influential theory. Under this theory, indirect 
discrimination is illegal because it is the functional equivalent of direct discrim-
ination; both entail illegal employment criteria which are not accurate predictors 
of productivity and which are not within the control of the applicant.42 Finally, 
the statistical discrimination theory holds that indirect discrimination is illegal 
because it isolates a type of discrimination that has been articulated in the 
economic literature.43 In contrast to this vigorous search for a theoretical basis 
in the United States, the efforts in the United Kingdom have been limited to 
one commentator.44 The indirect discrimination model is generally applied 
mechanically and without a clear, or even a tentative,45 understanding of its 
underlying purposes and functions. 46 
More prosaic implementation issues have also been addressed in the United 
States, but not in the United Kingdom. One issue that has arisen in the United 
States, for example, is whether there should be limits on the potential scope of 
the indirect discrimination model. Should the model, for instance, be available 
to white males who are disproportionately affected by an employment crite-
rion?47 Or should it be available to challenge the use by employers of broad 
employment criteria, such as the use of market wage rates to establish the pay 
of employees?48 Indeed, in the United Kingdom, the most basic implementation 
issues have not been resolved at all, or have been resolved with standards that 
AFFAIRS 107, 144-45 (1976); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. 
PA. L. REV. 540, 556-58 (1976). 
42 Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235 (1971). 
4' Willborn, supra note 40. 
44 See McCrudden Chonging Notions of Discrimination, paper presented at the United Kingdom As-
sociation for Legal and Social Philosophy, University College, London, April, 1984; McCrudden, 
Institutional Discrimination, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 303 (1982). 
45 The debate is as yet unresolved in the United States. 
46 Commentators in the United Kingdom have discussed how the indirect discrimination model 
should be applied, but have not articulated a theoretical basis for the model. See supra note 36. 
47 Some in the United States contend that the model should not be available to white males because 
the disproportionate impact does not arise from past discrimination. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COMM'N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980's: DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 
17 n.20 (1981); Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment After Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,42-43 
(1981); Chamallas, Evolving Conception of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise 
of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 366-69 (1983). To the extent the past discrimination 
theory is accepted as the basis of the indirect discrimination model, this is undoubtedly correct. But 
to the extent any of the other theories are accepted, it is questionable. Thus, the United Kingdom is 
in a particularly poor position to consider these issues because it has not yet begun to articulate the 
theoretical basis of the model. 
48 Since women as a group are paid less than men as a group, the use of market wage rates to 
establish the pay of employees is likely to have a disproportionate impact on women. Some courts in 
the United States have held that the indirect discrimination model should not be available to attack 
such broad employment criteria. AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984). 
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are so vague as to leave the decision maker with virtually uncontrolled discre-
tion.49 How much of a disparate impact is sufficient to meet the applicant's 
initial burden? In the United States, the "four-fifths rule of thumb" is well-
accepted,50 but there is also a great deal of discussion of more complex statistical 
methods of determining impact.51 In the United Kingdom, the case law is barren 
on the issue and there is very little discussion of it elsewhere. Should an em-
ployer be able to defend in an indirect discrimination case by proving that his 
employment practices overall do not have a disparate impact?52 In the United 
States, this issue has been definitively resolved after a great deal of debate.53 In 
the United Kingdom, the debate has not yet begun. What standards must the 
employer satisfy to meet its burden of proving business justification? Although 
this is an issue that must admit some decisionmaker discretion, various standards 
have been vigorously debated in the United States. 54 There has been some 
discussion of the appropriate legal standard in the United Kingdom,55 but the 
latest decisions find the issue to be "largely in the discretion" of the Industrial 
Tribunal. 56 
As with the direct discrimination model, the development of the indirect 
discrimination model in the United Kingdom has been very slow. The search 
for a theoretical basis for the model is still quite immature and many more basic 
implementation issues have not yet been addressed. 
'9 Uncontrolled discretion, as discussed earlier, is particularly dangerous in this area. See supra note 
9. 
50 See EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1984); 
Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 356-57 (8th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied sub nom., City of St. Louis v. United States, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). 
51 See, e.g., Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189,211-17 (1983); Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: 
Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 90 HARV. L. REV. 793, 805-06 (1978). But see Meier, Sacks & Zabell, 
What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 ABA FOUND. 
RESEARCH J. 139. 
52 As an example, assume an employer hires employees based on the results of interviews and a 
written test. A black applicant who was not hired proves that the written test has a disparate impact 
on black persons; he proves that 80 percent of all white persons taking the test passed it, but only 50 
percent of all black persons taking the test passed it. Should the employer be able to defend by proving 
that the hiring process as a whole (that is, the interviews and the written test) do not have a disparate 
impact on black persons? Should he be able to defend, for example, by proving that 10 percent of all 
white and black persons who apply eventually get jobs? 
53 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (employer cannot successfully defend in an indirect 
discrimination case by presenting bottom line statistics). 
54 See, e.g., Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 911 (1979); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-
Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974). 
55 See, e.g., Steel v. The Post Office [1977] IRLR 288 (E.A.T.); Panesar v. The Nestle Co. Ltd., [1980] 
l.C.R. 144 (C.A.): Kidd v. DRG (UK) Ltd., [1985]l.C.R. 405 (E.A.T.). 
56 Raval v. Dept. of Health & Social Security, [1985]l.C.R. 685 (E.A.T.). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Nearly two decades ago, the influential Street Report in the United Kingdom 
recognized that the mere enactment of antidiscrimination laws was "likely to be 
quite ineffective unless other factors [were 1 present."57 The author of this article 
agrees, but finds that a principal factor which is missing in the United Kingdom 
is ironically the very one the Street Report was to provide: a viable theoretical 
basis for the antidiscrimination laws.58 
The reasons for this theoretical shortcoming cannot be identified with great 
certainty. The shortcoming is not caused by the statutory language. The relevant 
statutes in the United Kingdom are very similar to those in the United States.59 
Nor is it caused by differences in methods of statutory interpretation. Although 
statutory interpretation in the United Kingdom can be quite restrictive, more 
liberal methods have been gaining ascendency, particularly in the area of human 
rights and discrimination.60 Moreover, restrictive methods of statutory interpre-
tation do not explain the failure of British commentators to forward and discuss 
theoretical issues. The shortcoming is not caused either by legitimate doubts 
about the theories propagated in the United States, for example, on doubts 
about the statistical emphasis of the U.S. theories. 61 A theoretical basis for the 
British discrimination laws has not been considered and rejected; it has simply 
not yet been considered. 
Having discarded these possible reasons for the theoretical shortcoming, one 
is left with two primary causes. First, it appears that there has been a lack of 
investment in this enterprise. Legal scholars, litigants, courts and others have 
not invested sufficient thought and resources in the articulation and develop-
ment of viable theories of employment discrimination.62 Second, there may be 
57 H. STREET, G. HOWE & G. BINDMAN, REPORT ON ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 62 (1967). 
58 The principal point of this article is not that the theories in the United States should be trans-
planted into the United Kingdom, see Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MODERN 
L. REV. 1 (1974), or even that the British theories should resemble the U.S. theories. The point is that 
an employment discrimination jurisprudence is being adequately developed in the United States and 
is not being adequately developed in the United Kingdom and that such ajurisprudence is an essential 
component of an effective legal regime to combat employment discrimination. 
59 See supra notes 6, 33. 
60 
If one looks back to the actual decisions of this House on questions of statutory construction 
over the last thirty years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from 
the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions. 
Carter v. Bradbeer, [1975] 3 ALL E.R. 158, 161 (H.L.) (Lord Diplock). See also Bulmer Limited v. 
Bollinger, [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, 1237-38 (C.A.) (Lord Denning). 
61 See, e.g., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 
(1971). 
62 I say this with some hesitation because I fully recognize the difficulties of defining a "sufficient" 
level of investment. At the same time, however, the comparative levels of investment in the United 
States and the United Kingdom are dramatically different. The United States has unquestionably 
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procedural reasons for the shortcoming. British law does not permit represen-
tative class actions as they are known in the United States. This hinders theo-
retical development because, where group claims are procedurally restricted, 
fewer cases are likely to be brought based on group theories63 and those that 
are brought are less likely to be financially viable.64 
If this analysis is correct, the message to the British is mixed. To the extent 
that the slow theoretical development is due to a lack of investment, there is 
room for hope. Although time has been lost and the antidiscrimination effort 
has been damaged, it is not too late to invest. Current investment may yield 
relatively rapid returns because it can draw upon theoretical developments in 
the United States and elsewhere.65 To the extent, though, that the slow theo-
retical development is caused by procedural shortcomings, the prospect is not 
so hopeful. That roadblock to development is not likely to be removed by the 
current or any later Tory government and, indeed, even a Labour or Alliance 
government would be unlikely to authorize class actions. 
The message to the United States from this comparison is more positive. 
Theoretical development is very difficult to assess, but at least in comparison 
with the United Kingdom, the degree of theoretical development in the United 
States has been adequate. Although there is still work to be done, particularly 
in developing a viable theoretical basis for the disparate impact model,66 there 
are no obvious roadblocks to that development as there are in the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, the message is positive because, although the existence of 
group-based claims has raised difficult issues, it is some comfort to discover that 
those same claims have, at least in comparison with the British experience, 
contributed to theoretical advancement. 
made a much greater investment in terms of the quantity of scholarly and judicial debate on the issues 
and, although admittedly more difficult to assess, the relative quality of the debate is also indicative 
of greater investment in the United States. I know of no British equivalents of the classic U.S. works, 
such as Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971); Brest, Foreword: In 
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. I (1976) or Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971). 
63 Specifically, fewer cases are likely to be brought under the disparate impact and systemic disparate 
treatment theories of discrimination. 
64 Individuals can bring claims based on group theories, but a class action mechanism permits the 
increased costs of these suits (for example, in gathering and analyzing statistical evidence) to be spread 
more broadly. 
65 I am not claiming here that theoretical advancement alone will eradicate the malaise enveloping 
British discrimination law. Other changes are also necessary. I am saying, though, that a sound 
theoretical basis is an essential component of a viable legal regime to combat discrimination and that 
the development of such a basis is one of the steps that must be taken to revive this area of the law. 
66 See Willborn, supra note 40. 
